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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of t:he 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
tANGELO TELLAY, 
Defendant and App,ellant. 
Appeal From Third Judicial District State of Utah 
Salt Lake County 
Hon. Clarence E. Baker, Judge 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
This case is unusual in that there is no question but 
that the defendant (hereinafter called the appel-
lant) is guilty of the crime charged. He so con-
fesses. (Tr. 68). The record shows that he in-
troduced no testimony to the contrary. 
State's Exhibit A is a transcript of a former trial 
beforfl Judge McConkie~ wherein the appellant was 
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defendant, involving the same 'incident of inter-
course as alleged in the instant information. Appar-
ently (although not clearly revealed by the record) 
appellant was charged in the forrner trial with rape 
of one Helen ......... , committed on the 22nd day 
of May, 1939, and as a defense to the prosecutrix's 
testimony of force, appellant testified in substance 
that he h'ad sexual intercourse with Helen as 
alleged and p~roved, but that such intercourse was 
not with force. (Tr. 68). Apparently the jury be-
lieved his testimony :and acquitted him of rape. 
'The testimony of the prosecutrix shows- that she 
was fift~en years of age ( Tr. 42') and that about 
9:00 P. M., May 21, 1939, she left her home at 104 
Yale Avenue and went for an auto ride "~th appel-
lant and two other boys; that they \vent to a beer 
garden and thence to a secluded place along Red-
\vood Road (Tr. 44). That the t\vo other boys left 
the parked car; and, that app~ellant, by force and 
against her will, had sexual intercours,e with her. 
(Tr. 45). That she was not married. That she re-
turned home about 1 :30 P. M. May 22nd and re-
ported the affair to her mother ( Tr. 46). 
Her mother testified in substance that her daughter 
Helen came home about 1:30 P. M. May 22nd and 
reported to her that: ''They got me.'' That her 
hair was mussed up, her face was dirty; her dress 
was torn and her stockings were torn. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
Appellant contends on the first proposition that it 
was error to allow the introduction of the testimony 
of the mother. We have s.earched appellant's brief 
for his merits to the above contention. ·we fail to 
find any good reason for his position. We have also 
searched n1ost of the cases he has cited and fail to 
find them analogous to the instant case. His cited 
ease of State v. \\Tinslow, 30 U. 403; 85· P. 433, seems 
to he more against his contention than in favor of 
it. For the court held that the testimony of the 
complaint of the incident by the prosecutrj;x to the 
\ri tness \Yas ad.Ip.issible. 
There seems no doubt but that a doctor's examina-
tion of the female organs of the prosecutrix inl-
mediately after the commission of the alleg·ed crime 
is admissible. Surely then the physical condition 
of the prosecutrix immediately after the alleged 
commission of the crime as related by her mother 
is admissible even though such testimony contains 
the unsolicited words of the prosecutrix: that 
''They got me.'' The rule is : 
"In a prosecution for rape a complaint 
made by the prosecutrix is admissible as 
corroborative of her testimony, because it 
is the natural and spontaneous expression 
of feelings, but snch eomplaint made in an-
s,yer to questions is inadmissible.'' 
People v. Moore, 276 Ill. 392; 114 N. E. 906. 
II. 
The appellant contends· secondly that the court 
Prr<>cl by allo,Ying State 'R Exhibit A to be intro-
<lured. Said exhibit is the transcript of record of 
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a former ease, wherein appellant confessed to the 
same act of intercourse under a charge of rape. 
Appellant's cited cases do not seem to pertain to 
his questioned error. They deal with incrilninating 
questions on cross-examination of the accused, 
(State v. Thorne, 76 Ut. 84; 287 P. 909) and with 
the question of whether or not a confession was 
voluntarily secured. (State v. vVells, 35 ·ut. 400; 
100 P. 681). 
In the instant case appellant never took the stand. 
Hence a question of improper cross-exanilnation is 
not applicable. 
In the former trial appellant freely and voluntarily 
'testified that he had sexual intercourse vvith the 
prosecutrix at the time and place as charged 
but that said intercourse was not through force as 
was testified by the prosecutrix. Thus appellant 
is foreclosed from· denying that this confession, 
Exhibit A, was received involuntarily. 
If app,ellant is comp·elled to testify in a judicial 
proceeding then we concede his state1nents 1nade at 
such judicial proceeding1 is no.t voluntary. Bnt in 
the instant case appellant being charged with rape 
did not have to testify. His taking of the witness 
stand was his free and voluntary act. 
'-The testimony of an accused voluntarily 
given as a witness on a prior trial of him-
self or another p·erson, for the- same crime 
"rj th which he iR being prosecuted may be 
introduced against him.'' 
Underhill's Criminal Evidence, Fourth 
Edition, Sec. 275, P. 545. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
Ill. 
Appellant's next contention is that he was once in 
jeopardy. This he contends arises. out of the trial 
court's refusal to allow him to introduce into evi-
dence the records of the former case of ra.pe where-
in he was acquitted; and also the trial court's in-
struction No. 5, to disregard the appellant's plea 
of once in jeopardy. He says that the Legislature. 
through Section 105-21-31, at p·age 226, Laws of 
Utah, 1935, made it mandatory for the prosecuting 
officials in charging rape to also put in a count 
charging carn~l knowledge. That is to say, a 
charge of the crime of rape also includes the crnne 
of carnal knowledge. Said section as pertinent 
provides.: 
''The- information or indictment must 
charge but one offense, but the same offense 
1-nay be set forth in different forms· under 
different counts; and V\rhen the offense may 
bP committed h:' use of different means, 
the means may be alleged in the alternative 
in the same count; provided . . . . that 
an information or indictment for rape may 
contain a count for carnal kno,vledge . . . '' 
(Italics ours). 
The plain wording of the above quotPd provision 
makes it discretionary whether or not a count in 
carnal knowledg-e mav be added to the crime of 
'--/ ... 
rape. It is fundamental that V\7here th~ langu~ge of 
a statute is plain it is not susceptible to judicial 
interpretation. 
The main point at issue under appellant'8 once-
in-jeopardy contention is whether or not carnal 
knowledge is an included offense '\vithin the crime 
of rape. Appellant offered Exhibit 1 "\Yhich was 
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the records and files of the former case of rape, 
wherein appellant was acquitted. The trial court 
apparently examined said records and files and 
found ,as a matter of law that rape was not an in-
cluded offense. Ap,pellant contends that the once 
in jeopardy question should have been subn1itted to 
the jury. It seems that such a contention is correct 
when there is a question of fact rai~ed as to the 
former jeop!ardy. In the instant case, there is no 
question of fact. The appellant himself confesses 
to carnally knowing the prosecutrix at the same 
time and place, the transactions b~ing· one and the 
same, so that all that was left to decide was a ques,-
tion of law as to 'vhether or not carnal knowledge 
is an offense included within the crin1e of rape. 
"The plea (once in jeopardy) is very 
simple in its structure and conE:ists partly 
of matter of record and partly of matter 
of fact. The matter of record is the former 
indictment and trial, while the matter of 
fact is the averment of the identity of the 
offense and of the defendant as the person 
named in the former indictment.'' 
14 Am: Juris. 957. 
Rape is a forced carnal knowledge,. It may be com-
mitted upon any female person. Carnal kno"rledge 
is limited only to female persons between the ages 
of thirteen and eighteen. The former is n1uch more 
of a heinous crime. Our statute imposes for rape 
the maximum penalty of life imprisonment. It thus 
follows that the intent is entirely different in each 
of the crimes, the former being an intent to ravish 
with force,. the latter being an intent only of car-
nally knowing the female under the age of cons~ent. 
It would be impossible to commit the crime of car-
nal knowledge upon a female over eighteen years of 
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ag·e. Thus it clearly app1ears that carnal knowledge 
is not an included crime within the crime of rape. 
The Constitution provides that one cannot he put 
in jeopardy twice for the same offense. That con-
stitutional provision does not mean that one cannot 
be put twice in jeopardy for the sa.me transaction. 
''The words 'same offense' mean san1e 
offense, in the same transaction, in the 
same acts, in the same circumstances or the 
same situation.'' 
State v. Winger, (Minn.), 282 N. W. 819; 
119 -A-~. L. R. 1202. 
See also 
L. R. A. Annotation at P. 1205. 
We have searched the judicial authorities in an 
effort to find a case on all-fours with the instant 
case. Strictly spe·aking, we have been unable to 
find such a case. However, we did find authority 
holding that 
''an acquittal _of rape is not a har to sub-
sequent prosecution for s.eductiori, based 
on the same single act of sexual inter-
cour~.e. '' 
Hall v. State, (Ala.), 32 S. 750. 
The test laid down in the said Hall case is as fol-
lows= A former acquittal is no bar to a subsequent 
prosecution, unless the accused could have been 
convicted upon the first indictment upon proof of 
the facts averred in the second. Such a test seems 
to cover thoroughly the instant case in that it is 
clear that the information and proof of carnal 
knowledge could not warrant a conviction of ra.pe. 
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From our search of the authorities, we believe that 
the general principle of law is best stated in 
15 American Jurisprudence, Section 390 at 
P~ge 65: 
''A putting in jeopardy for one act is no 
bar to a prosecution for a separate and dis-
tinct act merely becaus.e they are so close-
ly connected in point of time that it is im-
possible to separate the evidence relating 
to them on the trial for the one of them 
first had; consequently!' a plea of former 
jeopardy will not be sustained where it 
appears that in on@. transaction two dis-
tinct crimes were committed . . . '' 
27 American .Jurisprudence at Page 29 
says: 
''According to the ·weight of authority an 
acquittal of rape is no defense to a pros-
ecution for incest based upon the same act 
of sexual intercourse.'' 
The last quoted :general s,tatement is: found an-
notated in 
IJ. R. A. 1915A, at Page 257, under the 
case of 
State v. Ros.e, 106 N. E. (Ohio) 50. 
·Said Rose case, as p~ertinent, reads: 
"It is not enough that some single element 
of the offens~ charged may have a single 
element of soine other offense as to which 
the defendant has theretofore been in 
jeopardy, but the constitutional provisions 
require that it shall be thP 'same offense'." 
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IV . 
. A.ppellant 's next contention is based on the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence. His contention is centered 
around the testimony of the p~rosecutrix 'vhen she· 
''Te asked by Mr. Neeley: ''Are you Inarried ~'' 
answer: '~No, sir." Appellant contends that such 
an answer did not prove that she \Vas not married 
at the time of the commission of the offense. 
The above quoted question and answer immediately 
followed (Tr. 45) the testimony of the prosecutrix 
wherein she related the act of sexual intercourse 
committed by the appellant. The- reading of the 
transcrip1t shows that the question of marriage was 
related to the time of the alleged. act and not to the 
time the witness was being examined by the District 
Attorney. Therefore the element necessary 1n 
proving carnal knowledge, that the prosecutrix 
must he unmarried, "re believe is \Vell proved. 
As stated before this case is unusual in that there is 
no question of the appellant's guilt of carnal kno\vl-
edge. Such overwhelming evidence, with no evi-
dence to the contrary, \vith the ap·pellant's con-
fession to that effect, even if prejudiciaJ error 
arises, we believe such evidence \Yipes out all error. 
Prejudicial error is overcome, dissipated and wiped 
out where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. 
This doctrine is announced in the case of 
State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149; 277 Pacific 974, 
and is later followed in the recent -case of 
State v. Barone) 92 Utah 571; 70 Pacific 
(2d) 735. 
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'tV e believe that it would be a miscarriage of justice 
lto allow this app1ellant to escape punishment 
through a technicality of law or otherwise. 
New Code of Criminal P·rocedure, Laws of 
Utah, 1935, at P·age 222. 
We further believe that he had a fair and impja-rtial 
itrial and that the trial court's judgment should be 
affirmed. 
.8,espectfnlly submitted, 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney ·General. 
ZELPH S. CALDER, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
Attorneys for the ·State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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